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Abstract		The	goal	of	climate	change	governance	is	to	stabilize	greenhouse	gas	concentrations.	This	requires	the	reduction	of	anthropogenic	global	net	emissions.	In	the	pursuit	of	such	a	reduction,	knowledge	of	greenhouse	gas	sources	and	sinks	is	critical	to	define	baselines,	and	assess	the	effectiveness	of	climate	governance	over	time.	Such	information	and	the	means	to	independently	verify	its	credibility	continue	to	remain	out	of	reach	including	in	the	recent	Paris	agreement.	This	essay	argues	that	to	make	real	progress	in	mitigating	future	climate	change,	this	status	quo	must	be	challenged	both	intellectually	and	practically.	First,	it	proposes	to	acknowledge	and	address	the	inconsistency	between	the	objectives	of	a	climate	regime	and	the	role	of	transparency	as	a	mean	to	achieve	these	objectives.	It	does	so	by	redefining	transparency	as	the	addition	of	publicity	and	measurability,	which	turns	it	into	a	credible	information	generating	mechanism	for	governance.	Second,	it	shows	how	in	practice,	a	global	monitoring	system	of	greenhouse	gas	net	emissions,	based	on	this	new	definition	of	transparency	and	designed	as	a	global	public	good,	could	provide	the	necessary	knowledge	to	help	frame	governance	solutions	by	providing	both	credibility	and	completeness	in	understanding	the	scope	of	the	problem	to	solve.	
Introduction		In	the	ongoing	climate	negotiations	within	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	that	seek	to	stabilize	atmospheric	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	concentrations,1	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	has	recently	adopted	the	Paris	Agreement	and	its	objectives	of	“holding	the	global	average	temperature	to	well	below	2	°C	above	pre-industrial	levels	and	pursuing	efforts	to	limit	the	temperature	increase	to	1.5	°C.”2																																																											1	Article	2,	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(1994).	2	Article	2,	paragraph	b	of	the	Paris	Agreement	(2015).	
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To	promote	“effective	implementation”,	the	Agreement	establishes	“an	enhanced	transparency	framework”	to	provide	a	clear	understanding	of	climate	change	action.3	Parties	agreed	to	regularly	provide	national	inventory	reports	of	anthropogenic	GHG	emissions	by	sources	and	removals	by	sinks,	as	well	as	any	information	necessary	to	track	their	progress	in	implementing	and	achieving	their	nationally	determined	contribution	to	strengthen	the	global	response	to	climate	change.4	This	framework	will	be	implemented	“in	a	facilitative,	non-intrusive,	and	non-punitive	manner,	respectful	of	national	sovereignty,	and	avoid	placing	undue	burden	on	Parties,	”	characteristic	of	a	low	level	of	international	legalization.5		The	historical	record,	so	far,	suggests	that	voluntary	initiatives	and	self-reporting	mechanisms	are	insufficient	to	induce	compliance	and	effective	participation.6	This	is	particularly	well	established	for	regimes	that	need	to	create	cooperation	and	deter	free	riding	in	order	to	achieve	effective	governance.7	Furthermore,	the	information	review	and	compliance	mechanism	of	the	Agreement	based	on	experts	review	panels8	seems	rather	weak	if	such	panels	have	no	access	to	independent	means	of	verifying	the	information	provided	by	the	parties.9			This	raises	the	question	of	how	the	transparency	measures	of	the	Agreement	can	be	expected	to	be	sufficient	to	achieve	the	objectives	of	the	Agreement,	and	commit	major	emitting	countries	to	GHG	emissions	limitations,	in	the	first	place	when	it	seems	to	be	theoretically	unlikely.			The	current	scholarly	debate	on	the	implementation	of	climate	measures	that	opposes	top-down	and	bottom-up	approaches	seems	to	be	partially	responsible	for	this	problem.	10,11			While	both	sides	agree	on	the	role	of	transparency	as	publicity	that	is	an	information	creating	and	sharing	mechanism,	they	disagree	on	how	information	credibility	is	assessed.	Proponents	of	the	top-down	approach,	which	was	historically	pursued	before	Paris,	often	support	a	strong	centralized																																																									3	Article	13,	paragraph	b	of	the	Paris	Agreement	(2015).	4	Articles	2,	4	and	13	of	the	Paris	Agreement	(2015).	5	Abbott,	Kenneth	W.,	Robert	O.	Keohane,	Andrew	Moravcsik,	Anne-Marie	Slaughter,	and	Duncan	Snidal.	"The	concept	of	legalization."	International	organization	54,	no.	03	(2000):	401-419.	6	Peterson,	M.J.,	“International	Organizations	and	the	implementation	of	Environmental	Regimes,”	in	Young,	Oran	R.	(ed.)	Global	governance:	drawing	insights	from	the	environmental	experience.	(MIT	Press,	Cambridge,	MA,	1997).	pp.	115-151.	7	Barrett,	Scott.	Environment	and	statecraft:	The	strategy	of	environmental	treaty-making.	OUP	Oxford,	2003.	8	Article	13	paragraph	11	(transparency	framework)	provides	that	information	submitted	by	each	party	shall	undergo	technical	expert	review.	Article	15	establishes	an	expert	based	committee	to	facilitate	implementation	and	promote	compliance	with	the	provisions	of	this	Agreement.	9	The	most	likely	conclusion	of	such	review	panels	seems	rather	trivial:	data	submitted	are	consistent	with	themselves.	10	Hare,	William,	Claire	Stockwell,	Christian	Flachsland,	and	Sebastian	Oberthür.	"The	architecture	of	the	global	climate	regime:	a	top-down	perspective."	Climate	Policy	10,	no.	6	(2010):	600-614.	11	Sabel,	Charles	F.,	and	David	G.	Victor.	“Making	the	Paris	process	more	effective:	a	new	approach	to	policy	coordination	on	global	climate	change.”	Policy	Analsys	Brief,	The	Stanley	Foundation	(2016):	1-8.	
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monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	system.	Advocates	of	a	bottom-up	strategy	that	has	prevailed	in	the	Paris	Agreement,	on	the	other	hand,	promote	the	emergence	of	clubs	and	experts’	panels	for	information	review	but	recognize	at	the	same	time	that	a	useful	unified	mechanism	has	yet	to	emerge.	Both	sides,	in	their	arguments,	have	come	to	separate	the	notion	of	information	credibility	from	the	notion	of	transparency.			In	this	essay,	I	argue	that	to	reach	the	objectives	of	the	Paris	Agreement	as	stated	in	Article	2,	and	of	the	regime	complex	for	Climate	Change	more	broadly,12	climate	scholars	must	re-integrate	the	notion	of	information	credibility	in	transparency.	This	is	the	most	compelling	way	to	restore	intellectual	consistency	while	making	practical	efficacy	possible.	To	do	so,	I	propose	to	add	the	notion	of	measurability	to	the	notion	of	publicity	to	redefine	transparency.		This	way,	I	argue	that	for	a	regime	to	be	truly	transparent,	13	the	information	it	produces	must	be	both	public	and	measurable.	Recognizing	measurability	as	part	of	transparency	provides	the	tools,	to	not	only	assess	the	completeness	of	the	problem	to	solve,	but	also	the	information	credibility	necessary	to	make	the	debate	and	potential	negotiations	possible.	I	argue	further	that	in	the	case	of	regimes	that	seek	to	govern	physical	global	public	goods,	such	as	the	atmosphere,	measurability	needs	to	be	made	itself	a	global	public	good	to	facilitate	its	collective	governance.		Self-reporting	alone	satisfies	the	principle	of	publicity	but	not	necessarily	of	measurability.	In	the	case	of	global	GHG	emissions	and	sinks,	independent	data	to	support	the	evaluation	and	verification	of	states	declarations	or	actions,	i.e.	the	ability	to	attribute	emissions	and	sinks	to	a	state	that	can	ensure	a	satisfactory	level	of	treaty	compliance,	is	still	unavailable.14	Yet,	the	means	to	acquire	such	data	are	currently	an	active	area	of	research	and	development	in	the	most	technologically	advanced	countries.15			To	satisfy	the	public	good	principle	of	measurability,	governance	and	coordination	of	such	means	must	be	made	global.		The	development	of	a	global	GHG	monitoring	system	(GHG-GMS)	from	which	measurability	of	GHG	emissions	and	sinks	would	be	globally	available	could	satisfy	such	a	requirement.	I	conclude	that	self-reported	net	emissions	(publicity)	together	with	a	GHG-GMS	(measurability)	could	provide	the	adequate	level	of	transparency	necessary	for	collective	action.	A	GHG-GMS	could																																																									12	Keohane,	Robert	O.,	and	David	G.	Victor.	"The	regime	complex	for	climate	change."	Perspectives	on	politics	9,	no.	01	(2011):	7-23.	13	Brunnée,	Jutta,	and	Ellen	Hey.	“Transparency	and	International	Environmental	Institutions,”	in	Peters,	Anne,	and	A.	Bianchi	(eds).	"Transparency	in	International	Law."	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2013):	23-48.	14	Pacala,	Stephen	W.	et	al.	"Verifying	greenhouse	gas	emissions:	Methods	to	support	international	climate	agreements."	Committee	on	Methods	for	Estimating	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	(2010).	15	Ciais,	Philippe	et	al.	“Towards	a	European	Operational	Observing	System	to	Monitor	Fossil	CO2	emissions.”	(Copernicus,	European	Commission,	1995):	1-68.	Available	at:	http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/library/CO2_Report_22Oct2015.pdf	
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emerge	outside	of	the	UNFCCC	framework	and	be	built	from	a	variety	of	nodes	following	a	building	blocks	strategy	as	advocated	by	Stewart,	Oppenheimer	and	Rudyk.16		
Redefining	transparency	as	publicity	and	measurability		It	is	known	that	transparency	can	play	a	fundamental	role	in	treaty	making	and	enforcement.17,18,19	It	is	a	notion	difficult	to	define,	however.	20	International	environmental	agreements	(IAEs)	that	seek	to	regulate	global	public	goods	typically	require	the	production	of	information	in	the	form	of	reports,	disclosure	of	activities	or	submission	to	observation	and	inspection.21	Reporting	generates	information,	while	observation	and	inspection	provide	an	assessment	of	its	credibility.	Chayes	and	Chayes	suggest	that	the	availability	of	such	information	measures	the	transparency	of	the	regime.			In	practice,	transparency	helps	signal	a	party’s	commitment	to	an	agreement	before	and	after	successful	negotiations.22	Its	repetitive	or	continuous	provision	reassures	other	parties,	and	provides	a	basis	to	measure	any	departure	from	expected	behavior	making	it	a	central	mechanism	to	assess	compliance	and	facilitate	enforcement.23	It	also	provides	greater	accountability	of	actors	and	institutions,	24	and	supports	the	Publicity	Principle.25				These	descriptions	hint	toward	a	definition	of	transparency	as	the	practice	of	making	credible	and	valued	information	available	to	enlighten	the	state	decision-making	process.	This	assumes	that	critical	information	or	knowledge	for	decision-making	exists	in	the	first	place	as	well	as	the	mean	to	assess	its	credibility.			For	treaties	that	seek	to	regulate,	limit,	or	ban	a	physical	good,	creating	knowledge	of	that	good	requires	its	measurability		(i.e.	the	capability	to	measure	such	good).																																																									16	Stewart,	Richard	B.,	Michael	Oppenheimer,	and	Bryce	Rudyk.	"Building	blocks	for	global	climate	protection."	Stanford	Environmental	Law	Journal	32,	no.	2	(2013):	12-43.	17	Mitchell,	Ronald	B.	"Sources	of	transparency:	Information	systems	in	international	regimes."	International	Studies	Quarterly	42,	no.	1	(1998):	109-130.	18	Barrett,	Scott.	Environment	and	statecraft.	19	Aldy,	Joseph	E.	"The	crucial	role	of	policy	surveillance	in	international	climate	policy."	Climatic	Change	126,	no.	3-4	(2014):	279-292.	20	Ball,	Carolyn.	"What	is	transparency?."	Public	Integrity	11,	no.	4	(2009):	293-308.	21	Chayes,	Abram,	and	Antonia	Handler	Chayes.	"Compliance	without	enforcement:	state	behavior	under	regulatory	treaties."	Negotiation	Journal	7,	no.	3	(1991):	311-330.	22	Schelling,	Thomas	C.	"An	essay	on	bargaining."	The	American	Economic	Review	(1956):	281-306.	23	Simmons,	Beth	A.	"Compliance	with	international	agreements."	Annual	Review	of	Political	Science	1,	no.	1	(1998):	75-93.	24	Ebbesson,	Jonas.	“Global	or	European	only?	International	law	on	transparency	in	environmental	matters	for	members	of	the	public,”	in	Peters,	Anne,	and	A.	Bianchi	(eds).	"Transparency	in	International	Law."	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2013):	49-74.	25	Luban,	David.	"The	publicity	principle."	In	Robert	E.	Goodin,	The	theory	of	institutional	design	(Cambridge	University	Press,	1996):	154-198.	
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The	credibility	of	information	is	obtained	from	the	credibility	of	the	measurement	or	observation	that	can	be	established,	for	example,	by	its	independent	reproducibility.	In	the	context	of	regime	governance,	measurability	is	necessary	for	verifiability.26		Consequently,	the	timeline	between	technology,	knowledge	and	action	is	crucial	in	treaty	negotiation.	When	critical	information	is	lacking,	essential	players	may	be	unwilling	or	unable	to	coordinate	their	behavior.27	If	knowledge	is	required	for	action,	and	technology	is	required	for	knowledge,	then	technology	must	be	available	to	trigger	action.	The	absence	of	technology	to	establish	knowledge	only	supports	two	outcomes:	inaction,	for	example	the	inability	of	countries	to	cooperate	and	abate	collectively	GHG	emissions	since	1992,	or	inadequate	governance,	for	example	attempts	at	fisheries	regulation	when	species	critical	population	level	(the	minimum	number	of	individuals	to	sustain	a	population)	are	unknown.28			It	is	therefore	fundamental	to	seek	the	development	of	knowledge-creating	technology	when	it	is	unavailable.	Technology	is	not	a	static	object,	however,	it	continuously	evolves	and	ongoing	negotiations	or	established	regimes	are	affected	by	new	developments.	If	scientific	knowledge	can	be	considered	a	global	public	good,29	a	single	actor	can	have	an	important	impact	on	technological	development.	However,	technology	itself	is	not	a	public	good	and,	for	well-known	reasons,	states	may	have	little	incentives	to	share	their	technological	advancements.		What	are	the	implications	for	regime	transparency?	First,	transparency	requires	measurability	because	it	provides	evidence	that	the	information	made	public	is	credible.	In	the	context	of	a	court,	this	would	correspond	to	proving	the	facts	alleged.	Any	fact	not	proven	will	not	to	be	taken	into	account	by	a	tribunal:	idem	est	
non	probari	non	esse	(Riddell	and	Plant	2009).30	Second,	measurability	must	be	made	available	to	all	parties,	individually,	or	–	at	the	bare	minimum	–	to	the	parties	that	do	not	accept	public	information,	in	particular	self-reported	information,	prima	
facie	from	one	another	but	are	trusted	by	others.31	Third,	the	existence	of	a	trusted																																																									26	Breidenich,	Clare,	and	Daniel	Bodansky.	Measurement,	reporting	and	verification	in	a	post-2012	climate	agreement.	Washington,	DC:	Pew	Center	on	Global	Climate	Change,	2009.	27	Sabel,	Charles	F.,	and	David	G.	Victor.	“Making	the	Paris	process	more	effective:	a	new	approach	to	policy	coordination	on	global	climate	change.”	28	Barrett,	Scott,	and	Astrid	Dannenberg.	"Climate	negotiations	under	scientific	uncertainty."	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	109,	no.	43	(2012):	17372-17376.	29	Dalrymple,	Dana.	"Scientific	knowledge	as	a	global	public	good:	Contributions	to	innovation	and	the	economy."	In	The	Role	of	Scientific	Data	and	Information	in	the	Public	Domain:	Proceedings	of	a	Symposium,	pp.	35-51.	National	Academies	Press,	2003.	30	Something	that	is	not	proven	does	not	exist.	31	Here,	I	take	a	neoliberal	institutionalist	view	of	trust	in	international	relation.	According	to	Hoffman	(2002):	“trust	in	international	relation	refers	to	an	attitude	involving	a	willingness	to	place	the	fate	of	one’s	interests	under	the	control	of	others.	This	willingness	is	based	on	a	belief,	for	which	there	is	some	uncertainty,	that	potential	trustees	will	avoid	using	their	discretion	to	harm	the	interests	of	the	first.”	Hoffman,	Aaron	M.	"A	conceptualization	of	trust	in	international	relations."	European	Journal	of	International	Relations	8,	no.	3	(2002):	375-401.	
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institution	with	global	membership	as	part	of	the	regime	can	provide	a	substitute	to	individual	needs	of	measurability.		
Turning	Measurability	into	a	Global	Public	Good		If	publicity	and	measurability	are	a	response	to	the	absence	of	trust,	we	can	postulate	that	they	must	be	made	available	as	widely	as	possible	to	facilitate	the	construction	of	multilateral	regimes.	In	the	case	where	the	regime	purpose	is	to	govern	a	physical	global	public	good,	for	example	the	atmosphere,	then	the	means	to	measure	that	public	good	must	be	made	itself	a	global	public	good	to	facilitate	its	governance.32	These	means	must	themselves	be	trusted	–	if	they	are	to	be	used	to	perform	independent	data	analysis.		We	can	classify	independent	means	of	measurement	in	three	forms:	First,	they	can	be	single	state-owned	goods.	In	this	case,	they	are	often	refereed	as	national	
technical	means	(NTMs)	–	a	term	coined	during	arms	control	negotiations	between	the	US	and	USSR.33	An	agreement	where	measurability	is	provided	by	NTMs	assumes	a	certain	level	of	parity	and	reciprocity	in	the	means	of	measurement.	As	the	number	of	parties	to	a	treaty	increases,	the	probability	of	establishing	parity	–	that	is	the	availability	of	measurability	to	all	party	individually	–	certainly	decreases	because,	as	mentioned,	means	of	measurement	may	require	advanced	technology	such	as	space-based	sensors	and	large	resources.	This	is	particularly	problematic	when	an	international	environmental	agreement	seeks	to	govern	a	global	public	good.	Second,	means	of	measurement	can	be	club	goods	or	regional	public	goods.	For	example,	member	states	of	the	European	union	can	access	shared	spaced-based	instruments	through	the	European	space	agency.	However,	in	this	case,	means	of	measurement	are	excludable	and	subject	to	artificial	scarcity.	This	can	create	an	incentive	for	membership	in	the	club,	however,	and	reduce	accessibility	cost	to	measurement	resources.	Finally,	means	of	measurement	can	be	global	public	goods.	Here,	both	the	means	of	measurement	and	data	produced	are	fully	and	openly	available	through	a	global	institution	or	an	overlapping	network	of	clubs	that	would	achieve	global	(or	near	global)	membership	in	aggregate34.	The	World	Meteorological	Organization,35	and	the	international	monitoring	system	of	the	Comprehensive	Nuclear-Test-Ban	Treaty	(CTBT)36	are	two	important	examples.	Only	in	this	last	case,	parity	and	reciprocity	are	achieved	for	all,	providing	a	fair	and																																																									32	A	global	public	good	must	be	non-rival	in	consumption,	non-excludable	and	a	global	good.	33	Krass,	Allan.	"Verification:	How	Much	Is	Enough."	Stockholm:	SIPRI/Lexington	Books	(1985):	pp	271.	34	Casella,	Alessandra,	and	Bruno	Frey.	"Federalism	and	clubs:	Towards	an	economic	theory	of	overlapping	political	jurisdictions."	European	Economic	Review	36,	no.	2	(1992):	639-646.	35	Soroos,	Marvin	S.,	and	Elena	N.	Nikitina.	"The	World	Meteorological	Organization	as	a	purveyor	of	global	public	goods."	Contributions	In	Political	Science	355	(1995):	69-82.	36	United	Nations	General	Assembly,	“Comprehensive	Nuclear-Test-Ban	Treaty,”	(1992),	text	available	at:	https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treatytext.tt.html	
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non-discriminatory	access	to	independent	verification,	two	important	principles	in	international	law	making.37		
Creating	a	Global	Monitoring	Network	of	Green	House	Gas	Emissions		In	the	pursuit	of	collective	GHG	net	emission	reduction,	knowledge	of	GHG	sources	and	sinks	is	critical	to	define	baselines,	and	assess	the	effectiveness	of	climate	governance	over	time.	Current	international	negotiations	have	so	far	relied	on	self-reported	data	to	the	UNFCCC.	Such	data	are	most	of	the	time	based	on	proxies.	For	example,	CO2	emissions	are	usually	based	on	energy-use	statistics	collected	from	various	sources	in	different	sectors	of	the	economy.38	There	are	no	truly	independent	data	against	which	data	in	self-declared	inventory	can	be	compared.		Several	international	or	national	institution	such	as	the	United	Nations,	the	International	Energy	Agency,	or	the	United	States’	Department	of	Energy	(DOE)	Energy	Information	Administration,	create	large	international	datasets	on	energy	production	and	consumption,	but	all	of	these	datasets	rely	primarily	on	the	same	self-reported	national	statistics.	In	many	countries,	these	data	are	not	complete	or	accurate	or	are	not	consistently	reported.39,40	Recent	controversies	about	whether	or	not	China’s	emissions	have	potentially	peaked,41	and	if	the	country	is	burning	more	coal	than	it	is	reporting,	42	highlights	the	problem	of	continuously	relying	on	self-reported	data-proxies.			This	problem	is	likely	to	continue	for	the	foreseeable	future,	however.	The	UNFCCC	principle	of	“common	but	differentiated	responsibilities”	–	also	an	oxymoron	–	has	lead	states	to	declare	in	2015	their	national	emission	pledges	as	Intended	Nationally	Determined	Contributions	(INDCs),	which	have	become	the	basis	of	the	Paris	Agreement	and	its	“enhanced	framework”	for	transparency.	Obviously	this	framework	doesn’t	have	the	means	of	measurability	required	to	assess	the	credibility	of	public	information	declared	by	individual	countries.																																																										37	Franck,	Thomas	M.,	and	Thomas	M.	Franck.	Fairness	in	international	law	and	institutions.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press	(1995).	38	Ciais,	Philippe	et	al.	“Towards	a	European	Operational	Observing	System	to	Monitor	Fossil	CO2	emissions.”	39	US	Government	Accountability	Office,	Literature	on	the	Effectiveness	of	International	Environmental	Agreements,	RCED-99-148	(1999).		40	Pacala,	Stephen	W.	et	al.	"Verifying	greenhouse	gas	emissions:	Methods	to	support	international	climate	agreements."	41	Wong,	Edward.	“China’s	Carbon	Emissions	May	Have	Peaked,	but	It’s	Hazy.”	The	New	York	Times,	April	3,	2016,	available	at:	http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/world/asia/china-climate-change-peak-carbon-emissions.html?_r=0	42	Buckley,	Chris.	“China	Burns	Much	More	Coal	Than	Reported,	Complicating	Climate	Talks,”	The	
New	York	Times,	November	3,	2015,	available	at:	http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/china-burns-much-more-coal-than-reported-complicating-climate-talks.html	
	 8	
A	solution	to	address	this	important	problem	could	be	to	develop	a	global	monitoring	system	of	GHG	(GHG-GMS)	net	emissions.	Such	a	system	would	be	based	on	the	transparency	principles	of	publicity	and	measurability	and	should	be	designed	as	a	global	public	good.		A	GHG-GMS	has	the	potential	to	enable	the	accurate,	transparent	and	consistent	quantification	of	GHG	net	emissions	and	their	trends	at	multiple	spatial	scales.	43	It	can	provide	data	for	effective	local	and	regional	climate	and	energy	policies,	independent	means	of	measurement	of	GHG	net	emissions	for	countries	as	part	as	climate	agreements,	and	finally,	assess	aggregate	collective	efforts	to	mitigate	climate	change	as	well	as	provide	important	data	for	the	governance	of	the	atmosphere	–	a	global	public	good.			Atmospheric	measurements	provided	by	a	GHG-GMS	could	be	used	in	an	operational	system	that	could	comprise	three	complementary	components:	
• Atmospheric	measurements	obtained	from	dedicated	space-based	sensors	complemented	by	ground-based	(in-situ)	networks,	
• The	provision	of	bottom-up	information	(for	example	fossil	fuel	consumption)	available	by	linkage	through	the	UNFCCC	reporting	process	and	other	relevant	institutions	(potentially	with	higher	spatial	and	temporal	resolution),	
• A	trusted	and	certified	data-processing	center	that	will	integrate	both	types	of	information	into	consistent,	accurate,	and	independently	verified	estimates	of	GHG	net	emissions.		A	GHG-GMS	could	emerge	from	the	integration	of	existing	scientific	national	means	and	transnational	collaborations	following	a	building	block	or	bottom-up	strategy.44	Space-based	systems	have	experienced	important	development	recently.	Existing,	planned	and	potential	missions	(focusing	mainly	on	CO2)	include	OCO-2,	OCO-3,	and	potentially	GEOstationary	(all	operated	by	NASA)	in	the	United	States,	MICROCARB	in	France,	TanSat	in	China,	GOSAT-1	and	-2	in	Japan,	and	Proposed	Copernicus	missions	in	the	EU.45	All	these	countries	are	part	of	the	largest	emitters.	International	data	exchange	agreements	from	these	different	missions	would	facilitate	the	development	of	a	global	integrated	system.	In	addition,	a	GHG-GMS	could	benefit	from	emerging	private	actors	in	the	space	sector	that	could	have	interest	in	developing	large	constellations	of	sensors	(for	example	SpaceX	and	Google	Terra	Bella	among	others).																																																										43	This	section	draws	in	part	from	the	proposal	of	a	European	Union	integrated	monitoring	system	in:	Ciais,	Philippe	et	al.	“Towards	a	European	Operational	Observing	System	to	Monitor	Fossil	CO2	emissions.”	44	Stewart,	Richard	B.,	Michael	Oppenheimer,	and	Bryce	Rudyk.	"Building	blocks	for	global	climate	protection."	45	Ciais,	Philippe	et	al.	“Towards	a	European	Operational	Observing	System	to	Monitor	Fossil	CO2	emissions.”	
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On	the	ground,	important	networks	for	atmosphere	monitoring	include	ICOS	(Integrated	Carbon	Observation	System,	Europe-based),	NOAA	(global,	US-based),	TCCON	(Total	Carbon	Column	Observing	Network,	multinational),	AGAGE	(Advanced	Global	Atmospheric	Gases	Experiment,	US-funded),	FLUXNET	(network	of	regional	networks,	US-based),	and	GAW	(Global	Atmospheric	Watch,	operated	by	the	World	Meteorological	Organization).46		The	integration	and	further	development	of	both	space	and	ground	components	could	be	promoted	by	the	World	Meteorological	Organization	(WMO),	the	specialized	United	Nations	agency	for	meteorology	(weather	and	climate)	that	benefits	from	a	large	membership.	The	WMO	has	played	a	major	role	in	climate	negotiations	by	creating,	together	with	the	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	(UNEP),	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC)	that	is	the	scientific	advisory	body	of	the	UNFCC	process.		The	WMO	has	been	recently	developing	plans	for	an	Integrated	Global	Greenhouse	Gas	Information	System	(IG3IS).	Such	a	system	seeks	to	combine	“ground-based	and	space-based	observations,	carbon-cycle	modeling,	fossil	fuel-use	and	land-use	data,	meta-analysis,	and	an	extensive	distribution	system	to	provide	information	about	sources	and	sinks	of	greenhouse	gases	at	policy-relevant	temporal	and	spatial	scales.”		This	system	could	be	the	seed	to	develop	a	GHG-GMS	as	a	global	public	good.	The	IG3IS	is	“envisioned	as	an	independent,	observationally	based	information	system	for	determining	trends	and	distributions	of	GHGs	in	the	atmosphere	and	the	ways	in	which	they	are	consistent	or	not	with	efforts	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions.”	It	is	not	meant	to	statute	on	international	agreements	compliance	but	can	provide	the	necessary	transparency	to	do	so.47			During,	its	last	2015	meeting,	the	WMO	congress	has	requested	its	members:48	(1)	To	give	all	possible	support	to	the	development,	improvement	and	modernization	of	networks	for	observations	of	greenhouse	gases	and	co-emitted	species;	(2)	To	ensure	submission	of	observational	data	as	well	as	metadata	to	the	dedicated	WMO/GAW	Data	Centre	as	well	as	the	GAW	Station	Information	System	to	support	IG3IS;	(3)	To	collaborate	with	organizations	and	institutions	that	address	the	carbon	budget	of	biosphere	and	ocean.		The	WMO	has	an	important	advantage	over	the	UNFCCC	for	developing	a	GHG-GMS.	Decisions	are	voted	by	two-thirds	majority	of	the	vote	of	a	congress	formed	by	its	member	states,	49	while	the	UNFCCC	decisions	require	consensus.																																																										46	Tarasova,	Oksana	and	James	Butler.	“Implementing	an	Integrated,	Global	Greenhouse	Gas	Information	System	(IG3IS).”	Towards	a	Global	Carbon	Observing	System:	Progress	and	Challenges,	1-2	October	2013,	Geneva.	47	The	Integrated	Global	Greenhouse	Gas	Information	System,	World	Meteorological	Organization,	information	retrieved	at:	https://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/arep/gaw/ghg/IG3IS-info.html	48	Seventeenth	World	Meteorological	Congress,	Geneva,	25	May–12	June	2015,	Abridged	final	report	with	resolutions.	Accessed	at:	http://www.cmoc-china.cn:8080/upfiles/pdf/wmo_1157_en.pdf	49	Article	10b,	Convention	of	the	World	Meteorological	Organization	(1947).	
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	The	combination	of	emergent	sensors	networks	operated	by	individual	nations	or	clubs	(potentially	involving	private	actors)	and	the	potential	of	the	WMO	to	host	and	coordinate	the	growth	of	a	GHG-GMS	is	surprisingly	promising	and	shall	be	encouraged	in	a	more	vocal	way,	perhaps	by	getting	support	and	traction	from	civil	society.	This	approach	has	the	benefit	of	providing	measurability	for	the	climate	regime,	while	guarantying	a	fair	access	to	valuable	information	for	developing	and	smaller	states.	It	could	continue	to	evolve	in	the	future	to	provide	support	for	the	potential	regulation	of	atmospheric	geoengineering.			This	solution	does	require	the	technological	support	and	financing	of	a	handful	of	nations	that	are	also	the	largest	emitters	and	may	be	reluctant	to	provide	detailed	verified	information	about	their	emissions.			There	is	hope,	however,	as	all	majors	GHG	emitters	are	members	of	treaties	that	involve	measurability	sometimes	in	a	very	intrusive	manner.	Six	relevant	examples	are	briefly	presented	in	the	appendix.		They	show	precedent	of	large	area	monitoring	involving	aerial	photography,	international	network	of	sensors,	limitations	and	measurements	of	atmospheric	concentrations	of	regulated	substances	as	well	as	challenge	inspections	in	these	countries.	
Conclusion		Knowledge	of	greenhouse	gas	sources	and	sinks	is	critical	to	define	baselines,	and	assess	the	effectiveness	of	climate	governance	over	time.	Such	information	and	the	means	to	independently	verify	its	credibility	continue	to	remain	out	of	reach	including	in	the	recent	Paris	agreement.	To	make	real	progress	in	mitigating	future	climate	change,	I	argue	that	this	status	quo	must	be	challenged	both	intellectually	and	practically.			A	first	necessary	step	in	that	direction	is	to	acknowledge	and	address	the	inconsistency	between	the	objectives	of	a	climate	regime	and	the	role	of	transparency	as	a	mean	to	achieve	these	objectives.	In	this	essay,	I	did	so	by	redefining	transparency	as	the	addition	of	publicity	and	measurability,	which	turns	it	into	a	credible	information	generating	mechanism.		Second,	I	have	shown	how	a	global	monitoring	system	of	greenhouse	gas	net	emissions	based	on	this	definition	of	transparency	as	publicity	and	measurability	and	designed	as	a	global	public	good	could	provide	the	necessary	knowledge	to	help	frame	governance	solutions	by	providing	both	credibility	and	completeness	in	understanding	the	scope	of	the	problem	to	solve.			In	practice,	the	prospect	of	combining	emergent	sensors	networks	operated	by	individual	nations	or	clubs,	and	the	potential	of	the	World	Meteorological	Organization	to	coordinate	and	govern	a	global	monitoring	system	of	the	
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atmosphere,	including	greenhouse	gas	net	emissions,	is	surprisingly	promising	and	would	benefit	from	further	research.	 	
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Appendix.	Accepting	measurability:	some	evidence	from	existing	
multilateral	treaties	involving	large	GHG	emitters		This	appendix	briefly	presents	six	cases	in	which	major	GHG	emitters	have	accepted	measurability	in	multilateral	treaties,	sometimes	in	a	very	intrusive	manner.	Here,	I	consider	the	following	countries	or	entities:	China,	the	United	States,	the	European	Union	(28),	India,	the	Russian	Federation,	Indonesia,	Brazil,	Japan,	Canada,	and	Mexico.	These	treaties	are	concerned	with	the	limitation	or	ban	of	physical	substances	or	activities	–	or	of	global	information	gathering	such	as	general	military	activities.		They	all	allow	for	measurements,	observations	and	potentially	inspections,	all	relatively	intrusive	mechanism	of	independent	information	gathering.			These	treaties	are:		 1. The	Treaty	on	Open	Skyes	(US,	EU,	Russian	Federation	and	Canada).	The	treaty	establishes	a	program	of	unarmed	aerial	surveillance	flights	over	the	entire	territory	of	its	participants.	2. Comprehensive	Nuclear	Test	Ban	Treaty	(EU,	Indonesia,	Brazil,	Japan,	Canada,	Mexico	have	signed	and	ratified.	US,	Russian	Federation	and	China	have	signed).		The	treaty	establishes	an	international	monitoring	system	for	the	detection	of	nuclear	explosion.	It	consists	of	a	global	network	of	sensors	including	seismographs,	hydrophones,	infrasound	microphones,	and	radionuclides	air	sampling	stations.	3. MARPOL	73/78,	The	International	Convention	for	the	Prevention	of	Pollution	from	Ships	(All	are	members):	provides	the	right	to	inspect	ships	at	port	and	detain	them	in	cases	of	non-compliance.	It	introduced	air	pollution	standards	in	2005.	4. Chemical	Weapons	Convention	(All	have	signed	and	ratified):	Article	V,	Par.	7b	provides	the	right	to	conduct	challenge	inspection	anywhere	in	the	entire	territory	of	participants.		5. Montreal	Protocol	(All	have	signed	and	ratified):	monitors	regulated	substances	atmospheric	concentration	although	not	for	individual	countries.		6. Convention	on	Long-Range	Transboundary	Air	Pollution	(EU,	US,	Russian	Federation	and	Canada):		sets	up	the	Co-operative	Programme	for	Monitoring	and	Evaluation	of	the	Long-range	Transmission	of	Air	Pollutants	in	Europe	that	relies	on	collection	of	emission	data,	measurements	of	air	and	precipitation	quality.		
